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ABSTRACT:  This article traces the history of the British National Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War (NAS), and its 
interventions in Continental and colonial wars of the late-nineteenth century. The NAS was founded on the outbreak of the Franco-
Prussian War in August 1870. It went on to become one of the most important founding members of the British Red Cross Society 
(BRCS) when it was established in 1905. The aim of the article is to uncover the particular anxieties and aspirations that contributed 
to the foundation of the NAS. It demonstrates how these concerns –many of them related to the relative state of the British military– 
informed its subsequent practices and its relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross. In tracing its emergence as 
a paramilitary corps adept at rapid-response emergency medicine, this article uncovers the rivalry that characterized attempts within 
the NAS and BRCS to lay claim to the “true spirit” of voluntary aid in war –a rivalry which eventually informed British insistence on a 
revision to the Geneva Convention in 1906.
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RESUMEN: Este artículo rastrea la historia de la British National Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War (NAS) y sus 
intervenciones en las guerras europeas y coloniales de finales del siglo XIX. La NAS se fundó con el estallido de la Guerra Franco-
Prusiana en agosto de 1870. Acabó convirtiéndose en uno de los miembros fundadores más importantes de la Sociedad de la Cruz 
Roja Británica (BRCS) cuando se estableció en 1905. El propósito del artículo es mostrar las peculiares inquietudes y aspiraciones 
que contribuyeron a la fundación de la NAS. Demuestra cómo estas preocupaciones –muchas de ellas asociadas al status de los 
militares británicos– condicionaron sus prácticas subsiguientes y sus relaciones con el Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja. Al 
rastrear el surgimiento de la NAS como un cuerpo paramilitar experto en urgencias médicas de respuesta rápida, este artículo pone 
de manifiesto la rivalidad que caracterizó los intentos dentro de la NAS y de la BRCS por atribuirse el “verdadero espíritu” de la ayuda 
voluntaria en la guerra –una rivalidad que propició la insistencia británica en revisar la Convención de Ginebra en 1906.
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The International Committee of the Red Cross 
[ICRC], the self-appointed guardians of the Geneva 
Convention, are marking their 150th anniversary 
with historical reflection upon a venerable institu-
tion.1 These institutional histories do not evade con-
troversy or shy away from the challenging assertion 
that today their core values are being overshadowed 
by a bureaucratic imperative (Palmieri 2012). But they 
do describe an organisation with a taken-for granted 
status and long-standing influence. The irritated de-
scription by one nineteenth-century British observer 
of an “irresponsible Committee of Swiss gentlemen” 
who “perform no function that is of real importance” 
may come, therefore, as something of a surprise.2 Fur-
ther probing reveals the extent to which in the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries the British 
medico-military establishment ensured that the ICRC 
was kept marginal, and on occasion made to bow to, 
its concerns. For in Britain, as elsewhere, the devel-
opment of organisations and regulations for the pro-
tection of the sick and wounded in war was as much 
the manifestation of anxiety over the relative strength 
of the British military, as it was the embodiment and 
gradual popularisation of a shared humanitarian ide-
al. Allusions to “neutrality”, “voluntarism” and “hu-
manity” –far from being foundational or stable– oper-
ated within a politics of relief that enmeshed articula-
tions of British foreign policy and imperial mission 
with shifts in the purpose of voluntary aid and the 
changing nature of the state itself. This article traces 
the early history of the British voluntary aid move-
ment, investigating how these considerations shaped 
the practices, technologies, and protocols that came 
to be associated with the role of the Red Cross in war. 
It also demonstrates how these priorities determined 
the relationship between the British National Society 
for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War (forerunner 
of the British Red Cross Society) and the ICRC, and 
how they eventually informed British insistence on a 
revision to the Geneva Convention in 1906. Such an 
approach raises questions about how we write the 
history of the Red Cross movement and the history of 
humanitarianism more generally. 
This, then, is an example of organisational history 
–but one written through reference to a broad web of 
affiliation and practice. In this way, this article revises 
a more traditional tendency to write the history of the 
Red Cross movement through the internal politics of 
the ICRC to the exclusion of the history and practice 
of the aid worker, or to approach the history of hu-
manitarianism as an exercise in the history of ideas or 
international relations.3 Historians have emphasized 
a revolution in conscience, pity, ethics and “affective 
relationships” in this period, but have tended to over-
look the decisions of committee members, the ethi-
cal dilemmas of aid workers on the ground, and the 
discordant ways in which individuals appropriated the 
vocabulary of empathy and rights.4 Thus while a his-
tory of Evangelical and Enlightenment ideas of rights 
and duties has merit in helping to trace reconfigura-
tions in the meaning of “humanity”, the relationship 
of ethics to practice and ideals to organisational form 
tend to be assumed rather than described.5 Often it 
is more interesting to consider, for example, how re-
lief workers in the Ottoman Empire appropriated the 
legacy of the anti-slavery crusade than consider them 
the direct heirs of shared compassion and idealistic 
conviction. By the same token, other than mention 
Henri Dunant and other “founding fathers” there is a 
tendency to write peopleless history, sidestepping the 
logistics experts, pioneering medics, innovative nurs-
es, adventurers, committee stalwarts and assorted 
cranks who administered relief societies and ran their 
hospitals. Yet personality mattered, as did the family 
dynasties and married couples who in Britain tended 
to keep this activity in-house and proudly amateur. 
A recent surge of interest within International Re-
lations scholarship has seen “humanitarian interven-
tion” depicted as an ideal against which various ac-
tions are tested (Trim, Simms, 2011, pp. 4-5.). The 
focus has been diplomatic and military intervention 
undertaken, sometimes coercively, by states in col-
laboration with other states. The point has been to 
establish that such action has always been a feature of 
international relations rather than a (recent) anomaly 
and that state sovereignty has never been considered 
absolute (Trim, Simms, 2011, p. 5). But in excluding 
“non-state” actors from this analysis, the role of vol-
untary organisations in priming political actors and 
engaging in unofficial diplomacy has been ignored, 
and the multifaceted nature of this intervention is 
overlooked. As Stéphanie Prévost notes, “humanitar-
ian diplomacy” took place in the nineteenth century 
–as today– by non-state actors engaged in securing 
access to populations in distress and often in close 
collaboration with the consular services.6 She points 
to the work of Philippe Régnier in elaborating the 
ways in which, in disaster or conflict situations, such 
diplomacy takes place on the ground, often in prag-
matic fashion (Régnier, 2011, p. 1221). Moreover, in 
the nineteenth century, it was quite common for relief 
workers to consciously pursue the foreign policy aims 
of their party and country if they considered the sta-
bilization or liberation of a suffering population to be 
a moral cause in the British national interest. 
This means that we cannot extricate the history of 
state intervention from the range of actors who un-
dertook interventions abroad in the name of human-
ity –and without addressing the very varied motiva-
tion and sense of moral purpose which they invoked. 
On the one hand, there is too much of a desire to 
disentangle the state from the “NGO”: indeed this 
terminology, and this concern for organisational “in-
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dependence”, would seem overly to reflect a present-
day preoccupation within the sector (Trim, Simms, 
2011, p. 20; Rodogno, 2011, p. 3). Indeed, for much 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
relief workers inhabited overlapping circles within 
politics, the War Office, consular services, charities, 
journalism and academia, such that many could be 
said to be part of the governing establishment. Very 
rarely did the “career” relief worker exist; more com-
monly, those dispensing aid in a foreign conflict were 
seconded from the army or were men of business, 
nurses or charity workers, consulate staff, or surgeons 
on leave from a teaching hospital. Far from stable sec-
tors, the state and voluntary organisations intersected 
and were themselves in flux: the Red Cross movement 
in Britain was at once a prime example of the “civilian-
ising” of the army in this period, and a militarisation 
of civil society (Summers, 2000, chap. V). On the other 
hand, the allusion to Régnier’s notion of the contin-
gencies of “humanitarian diplomacy” in the field di-
rects our attention to how this establishment oper-
ated in practice and to the ethics of action, and thus 
to why a focus on the ideals of the ICRC and Geneva 
Convention will only ever reveal part of the story. It is 
telling that those dispensing aid for the British Nation-
al Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War were 
as likely to declare their neutrality in foreign conflict 
a facet of their English chivalry, as they were to make 
reference to the articles of the Geneva Convention. 
THE FOUNDATION OF THE BRITISH NATIONAL SOCIE-
TY FOR AID TO THE SICK AND WOUNDED IN WAR
The British National Society for Aid to the Sick and 
Wounded in War (NAS, hereafter) had its first public 
meeting on 2 August 1870 not, as might be expected, 
in anticipation of fearful casualties from the Franco-
Prussian War, but because the moment was oppor-
tune to proclaim the “cause of humanity” and to stir 
fears for the welfare of British troops in a similar con-
flict.7 Lt.-Col. Robert Loyd Lindsey V.C., hero of the Cri-
mea (and very-nearly a casualty of its hospitals) was 
elected Chair. Many of those who met in Willis’ Rooms 
on Piccadilly that day had for several years been at-
tempting to found a national society for the aid of the 
wounded in war but had failed to arouse the necessary 
enthusiasm. Now, with the prospect of an ascendant 
Prussia, and a question mark over Britain’s fighting 
strength, observers of military affairs found these 
matters suddenly pressing. Loyd Lindsay’s father-in-
law, the wealthy banker Lord Overstone, grumbled 
that “[t]he state of our Army … is ridiculous”, and took 
up a place on the Executive Committee.8 Despairing 
of Gladstone’s retrenchment at the War Office, Over-
stone trusted that his country would “learn a solemn 
lesson from the works of Bismarck and of Moltke” and 
attend to military capacity.9 The War Office, reluctant 
to sponsor a voluntary aid corps officially, neverthe-
less wished to observe Continental developments at 
a distance; and, with the launch of the NAS, now had 
the means to do so. 
The spur for the meeting was a letter to The Times 
from a Capt. Burgess of the Order of St John in Eng-
land, urging consideration that “Every country in 
Europe, except England, has its “Société de Secours 
aux Blessés et Malades Militaires”. Now is our op-
portunity to form a strong British ‘Society of Help for 
the Sick and Wounded.’”10 “It should be well under-
stood”, he clarified a few days later, “that our object is 
not to interfere in any way with the military medical 
staff, but to temporarily tend the wounded until the 
hardworked surgeons can look to them – to gather 
men from the battlefield instead of leaving them to 
be there, in horrible pain and thirst, unsheltered and 
helpless, for hours or days. We want to help the sur-
geons, not to hamper them.”11 The principle of first 
aid on the battlefield was thus put forth: and it would 
be precisely in its emergency care and transport serv-
ices that the NAS, in an uneasy collaboration with the 
Order of St John, would find its niche. 
The Times returned to the theme of English defi-
ciencies a week later when it reviewed Help for the 
Sick and Wounded, a translation by John Furley of La 
Guerre et la Charité, a guide to the organisation of 
voluntary aid by Gustave Moynier and Louis Appia of 
the ICRC. Furley had intended to “call public attention 
to the subject”, and The Times duly pressed the vir-
tue of “private individuals, as members of the great 
brotherhood of civilized humanity, [doing] their best 
to remedy this insufficiency”.12 They reported how, 
“during peace, such relief societies ought to find for 
themselves employment in works of humanity more 
or less analogous to their duties in times of war” in 
“such disasters as railway accidents, mining accidents, 
and accidents by floods”.13 Bound with Furley’s trans-
lation were two further pieces, the one a lecture to 
the Royal United Services Institution by Deputy-In-
spector-General of Hospitals Sir Thomas Longmore 
on the Geneva Congresses, the other a report on 
the care of the sick and wounded in war by Captain 
Brackenbury of the Royal Artillery. Burgess, Furley, 
Longmore and Brackenbury, all members of the re-
cently revived Order of St John, would soon become 
the pivot of exchange between the NAS, ICRC and re-
formist elements at the War Office. 14 From the outset, 
they shared an assumption that greater proficiency in 
emergency care and exposure to innovations in medi-
cal practice abroad would inspire public interest in the 
question of soldiers’ welfare and provide a necessary 
spur to the modernization of the army medical servic-
es at home. It was for this reason that Florence Night-
ingale, though worried that Genevan initiatives might 
“render war more easy”, was nevertheless quick to 
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lend her support to the fledging NAS and stamp her 
mark upon it.15 As she opined to her ally Sir Thomas 
Longmore, 
I am more than ever convinced that Governments 
should be made responsible for their own Sick and 
Wounded – that they should not decline Volunteer, pri-
vate, benevolent effort but that, exactly in the measure 
that this is incorporated in, not substituted for Govern-
ment organisations (for sick and wounded).16
Sir Thomas Longmore, the first professor of mili-
tary surgery at Netley, and the pre-eminent military 
surgeon of his day, had for several years been cor-
responding with Nightingale on the topic.17 He had 
represented Britain at the Geneva Congress at which 
the 1864 Geneva Convention had been negotiated, 
and was mindful of the lessons of the earlier medico-
military disaster in the Crimea. Indeed, it was Night-
ingale’s War Office memorandum on the arrange-
ments of the army medical service for future conflict 
that he had been instructed to uphold in Geneva. His 
brief was to consent to international protocols only 
so far as they complemented existing British mili-
tary provision. Thus a proposal to create teams of 
independent medical volunteers, first discussed at a 
preliminary Genevan Congress of 1863 (and a central 
proposal of Henri Dunant’s A Memoir of Solferino) 
was to be strictly opposed. From Geneva, Longmore 
had written to London that, “there is no intention of 
discussing at this Congress the question of Volunteer 
assistance or of any modifications of the ... manage-
ment of the existing military hospital system of any 
country.”18 Nightingale could be reassured, that, on 
paper at least, no unregulated or amateur volunteer 
would dilute the government’s proper responsibility 
for the wounded or divest trained nurses of a new 
vocation in war. An invitation from Capt. Burgess to 
address the Royal United Services Institution in 1866 
provided Longmore with opportunity to publicize 
the protocols of the new Geneva Convention in Brit-
ain and to stress their confines: 
I have dwelt upon the special purpose of the Con-
gress, because it was supposed by some persons that 
the question of independent volunteer attendants, 
which had been discussed, as I have already men-
tioned, in the former assembly of 1863, was again 
to be opened and discussed in the Congress of 1864. 
This erroneous supposition led to the Congress be-
ing regarded with suspicion, and even with positive 
disapprobation, by some who would doubtless have 
regarded it very differently had no such views been 
entertained by them. 19
Membership of the Order of St John had brought 
Longmore into the milieu of a group of men and 
women eager to appropriate the Hospitaller tradi-
tion of the original medieval Knights of St John. The 
current Order of St John of Anglia was established in 
the 1860s, its members combining a Victorian love of 
chivalry with a desire to perform “good works”.20 An 
earlier attempt at nursing the sick poor had foundered 
for lack of money; but they had soon taken up a new 
crusade: the care of those wounded in war and in-
dustrial accident. Unfortunately, however, their views 
on the role of the volunteer in war brought them 
into almost immediate conflict with Loyd Lindsay 
and the wealthy patrician amateurs of his extended 
and influential circle. The dispute over the meaning 
and purpose of voluntary aid in war would divide the 
Red Cross movement in Britain for a generation. The 
creation of an auxiliary voluntary medical corps was 
anathema to those who valued the independence and 
outspokenness that came with organisational autono-
my. For Loyd Lindsay, it was precisely this independent 
spirit of “voluntarism” which would ensure public do-
nations, and draw attention to the needs of those the 
army medical services did not deem a priority. Had a 
NAS existed at the time of the Crimea, “much suffer-
ing would have been averted and many lives saved”. 
As Loyd Lindsay’s wife and biographer explained, 
[w]hat he saw and experienced during that campaign 
impressed itself deeply on his mind; he realised that 
however well organised an Army Medical Service may 
be, it never has been, and never will be, able to cope 
adequately with the sudden emergencies of war on a 
large scale, and he held that voluntary organisations, 
unimpeded by official restrictions, are alone capable 
of giving auxiliary relief and of providing extra com-
forts and luxuries with the requisite promptitude and 
rapidity (Lindsay, 1907, p. 172).
FIRST AID IN WAR: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A 
SPECIALISM
From his vantage point at Netley, the model mili-
tary hospital constructed after the Crimean War, 
Longmore was able to survey the growth of mili-
tary surgery and of a whole slew of inventions and 
appliances designed to aid rapid treatment and 
recovery. In the treatment of gunshot wounds he 
became an authority. Those of his papers preserved 
in the Wellcome Library in London reveal the de-
velopment of a transnational field of expertise in 
the retrieval, conveyance and accommodation of 
the sick and wounded, covering everything from 
the use of antisepsis to the deployment of hospi-
tal trains. As early as 1869, Longmore and Furley 
were corresponding on the subject of “flying hospi-
tals”, designed to replace the stationary hospital of 
the Crimean War with temporary hospital tents.21 
Medical volunteers were to act as a flying corps 
occupied in bearing stretchers, driving ambulance 
wagons, and staffing temporary hospitals. The 
merit of these proposals were to be borne out by 
the desultory experience of the French wounded in 
1870, and bolstered by the far superior example of 
Prussian sanitary and medical arrangements. 
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Though prevented by illness from joining the NAS 
on its first mission to France, Longmore followed its 
work through the writings and communications of col-
leagues who had either volunteered in a private ca-
pacity, such as John Furley of the Order of St John, or 
had been seconded from the army medical services. 
The Franco-Prussian war, with an already insufficient 
French army medical corps stretched to capacity, pro-
vided the British volunteers with a welcome degree of 
latitude to survey and to experiment. “We … saw and 
did much good surgical work, for which there was am-
ple material and constant opportunity”, Henry Rundle 
observed from his post as surgeon with the Prussian 
forces.22 The chance was taken to trial Lister’s anti-
septic methods in war (and to note the difficulty of 
transporting the necessary equipment) and to experi-
ment with the subcutaneous administration of mor-
phine for bullet wounds. Creswell Hewett noted “the 
experience which we ought to gain for our own use, 
in the management of our War Services”.23 This les-
son was not lost on Ernest Hart, the editor of the Brit-
ish Journal of Medicine, who commissioned pieces by 
British surgeons at work in the war, and volunteered 
his own services for the distribution of material in 
France (Rundle, n.d., p. 34). His publication of “articles 
from the front” by William MacCormac of St Thomas’ 
Hospital in London revealed the curiosity of a young 
surgeon to “see what military surgery was like” (Mac-
Cormac, 1871, p. 1). These remarkable articles (subse-
quently published in book form) interspersed humane 
reflections on the suffering of war with picturesque 
jottings on the French countryside. They also enumer-
ated a series of case histories with clear pedagogical 
intent. Within the turn of a page one could learn how,
The stillness during the ride that bright sunny autumn 
afternoon was most oppressive, and the beautiful sky 
overhead formed a contrast to the earth beneath, 
outraged by human passion and violence, that af-
forded food for reflection … 
Today I used the trephine in a case of depressed frac-
ture with compression of the brain from effusion, of 
which I may give a few particulars (MacCormac, 1871, 
p.p. 62-63).
Sandford Moore, assistant-surgeon to the 4th 
Royal Irish Dragoon Guards, concurred that “rare op-
portunities were thus presented” for observation of 
foreign medical arrangements, especially “the work-
ing of the wheeled transport, British and Prussian, 
the former of which had not been previously tried in 
European warfare” (Moore, 1872, p. 6). This became 
the subject of a thorough survey. The Prussian am-
bulance wagons were described in sufficient detail 
that a replica could be constructed, down to the op-
timum radius of the wheel and the requisite elastic-
ity of the springs. Sandford Moore also observed the 
dispatch to the seat of war in October 1870 of the 
Woolwich Ambulance, run in the name of the NAS, 
but operating as an experiment in British ambulance 
provision under the direct control of the Deputy-
Inspector-General, and provided at cost price from 
British military stores. The Woolwich “field” hospital 
(with 12 hospital marquees, 8 ambulance wagons, 
27 members of the army hospital corps and provi-
sions and bedding for 200 patients) was the first of 
its kind to be used by a British military staff. Its de-
parture offered opportunity for a rehearsal. 
During the Franco-Prussian War, the NAS oversaw 
complete ambulance units such as the Woolwich, as 
well as individuals attached to the French and Ger-
man medical services. In total, the NAS engaged 
110 people to distribute aid and provide medical as-
sistance, comprising 62 surgeons, 16 nurses and 32 
agents responsible for running depots in France.24 
NAS personnel were expected to telegraph the Soci-
ety at home of their requests for stores and equip-
ment, and the NAS in turn to equip a series of depots 
in north-eastern France. The ad hoc nature of NAS 
services, limited by duplications and inefficiency, was 
eventually replaced with a systematic operation. Its 
success was testimony to the logistical skill of Capt. 
Henry Brackenbury, who had been seconded from 
the army for the purpose. He started by founding 
the depot at Arlon, before laying down supply lines 
between hospitals in the district of Metz and the Ar-
dennes. “The great questions now are depôts and 
transport. To have the stores at hand and the means 
of conveying them where wanted are the two first 
necessities of the moment.”25 Under Brackenbury’s 
guidance, the NAS quickly assumed the bearing of a 
military operation and he soon took to styling himself 
the “commander-in-chief, from whom [relief workers] 
get systematic instructions.”26 Brackenbury, a man of 
great perspicacity, was Professor of Military History 
at Woolwich, and a sometime war-correspondent 
for the Standard. His experience and his considered 
views on the role of the Red Cross in war, some of 
which he voiced in print, would make him a valuable 
link between the Order of St John and the War Office 
modernisers associated with Sir Garnet Wolseley. 
Like her associate Sir Thomas Longmore, Florence 
Nightingale’s health prevented direct observation 
of British relief work in France, though she too had 
a hand in the arrangements described by her corre-
spondents. Her priority was to prove the efficacy of 
the female nurse in war. Through the presence of her 
brother-in-law Sir Harry Verney on the Committee of 
the NAS, and her sister, Emily, on the Women’s Com-
mittee, Nightingale was able to influence the vetting 
process. As she instructed them, “I hope to learn what 
the Committee think on all these points, and propose 
to do, before they take any step about Volunteer Nurs-
es”.27 “Col Lindsay is quite right about Volunteer Nurs-
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es”, she advised, “They may make themselves a ter-
rible nuisance (or even an immoral nuisance) unless 
under certain rules, under proper authority and round 
a trained nucleus.”28 Nonetheless, if Loyd Lindsay was 
to be commended for his appreciation of the trained 
nurse, he was to be censured for his amateurism: “I 
am terrified at what you say that Col. Lindsay is “per-
plexed what to do and how to begin”. Have they really 
got no further than this? It makes one despair of Eng-
lishmen.”29 This refrain would become a familiar one. 
Nightingale could, however, take satisfaction that the 
trained nurse was proving her worth. Sandford Moore 
spoke for many: “Women are better adapted, both 
physically and morally, for the charge of the sick than 
men. They should, however, in order advantageously 
to fulfil their mission of good, be adequately trained, 
and then they become invaluable” (Moore, 1872, p. 
83). Nightingale was further reassured by the letters 
from the front of her protégé Florence Lees and it was 
to Lees that the task fell of summing up the Nightin-
gale position in an appendix to the NAS’s report.30 De-
crying the sight of “English ladies rushing wildly over 
the country, sleeping sometimes in the open field, and 
writing thrilling letters home of their work and hard-
ships”, Lees proposed the appointment, in future con-
flicts, of a “Director-General of the Medical Staff with 
all surgeons, dressers, lay agents, and commissariat 
arrangements at his absolute control (he himself be-
ing under …the Society)”. He would be assisted by,
some gentlewoman appointed as Superintendent-
General of Nurses, having the direction of all 
superintendents, sisters, and nurses who were on 
the staff of the Society, to whom all complaints 
concerning such should be made, and who should 
be responsible to the Society for the right use of the 
powers entrusted to her.31 
THE “TRUE” SPIRIT OF VOLUNTARY AID IN WAR
For Nightingale, and for the Order of St John, the 
lessons of the Franco-Prussian War confirmed their 
existing views on the need for an on-demand auxil-
iary medical service staffed by trained volunteers and 
under War Office control.32 “Before the first shots are 
fired”, Brackenbury suggested,
a chief representative should be sent to each army in 
the field. He should organise on the spot small move-
able ambulances, each consisting of say two or three 
surgeons; a few surgical or medical stores; and a light 
conveyance. … It is most important that this organi-
sation should be formed before the hostilities com-
mence. It was most unfortunate that circumstances 
prevented our Society from organising its aid in the 
commencement of this campaign.33
Longmore was adamant that the NAS in France did 
not have a legitimate status: that it had claimed for 
itself the immunity of a neutral voluntary organisation 
when no such position existed under the 1864 Geneva 
Convention. As he was at pains to make clear to the 
Royal United Services Institution:
The Geneva Convention is simply a Treaty entered into 
by certain Governments with regard to the manner 
in which the sick and wounded of their armies, the 
staff employed in ministering them, and the military 
hospitals and hospital materiel, are to be respectively 
dealt with in case of two or more of those Govern-
ments waging war with each other. … The treaty no-
where contains reference to the neutralisation of any 
one not forming part of the Staff originally employed 
in the service of the ambulances and hospitals of the 
belligerents; there are no stipulations in it regarding 
private persons (Longmore 1866, p. 7).
Yet the other lesson of the Franco-Prussian War was 
that suffering and need, especially if measured by ci-
vilian standards of hygiene and comfort, would almost 
always leave room for amateur and freelance assist-
ance, especially when bankrolled by wealthy patrons. 
And so it proved that the ideal of prepared, trained 
and disciplined voluntary aid on the battlefield, now 
the defining principle of the Order of St John’s work 
in this regard, could never fully be met, not least be-
cause the Order had only meagre financial resources. 
The interfering “do-gooder” and the “lady amateur” 
rapidly became the Order of St John’s bêtes noires: 
John Furley complained of “spasmodic fussiness and 
philanthropic insanity” and this became something of 
a mantra (Furley, 1885, p. 879). Yet for NAS Chair Loyd 
Lindsay, things stood rather differently. The NAS had 
received a windfall of cash donations during the Fran-
co-Prussian War, far exceeding its expectations. In a 
letter, Lord Overstone described how, “the contribu-
tions pour in so rapidly and to so large an amount that 
it has been found necessary to enlarge the sphere of 
operation – and to undertake duties which were not 
at first in contemplation.”34 At the end of the war, a 
large amount of the £297,000 bestowed on the NAS 
remained unspent. 35 This gave the organisation finan-
cial independence; indeed, it did not have to make a 
direct appeal for funds until the Boer War of 1899-
1902. For those at the Order of St John, this surplus 
seemed ripe for funding a peacetime ambulance 
corps. Loyd Lindsay demurred. “[T]he public mind … 
was not likely to respond to any elaborate organisa-
tion or preparation in time of peace,” and “what was 
given was spontaneously given”, he cautioned. For, he 
argued, “one of the great advantages of voluntary so-
cieties is, that their agents can work untrammelled by 
military regulation”.36 
At the close of the Franco-Prussian War, disputes 
over the spirit and purpose of voluntary aid resulted 
in the resignation of several members of the Order 
of St John from the NAS and the foundation of their 
own “Ambulance Department”. Furley and his circle 
channelled their frustration into a new campaign: the 
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winning over of public and political opinion to the Or-
der’s scheme of ambulance work. As Col. Brackenbury 
recounted, 
After mature consideration, it seemed to me I had a 
duty beyond that which I owed the Society –a duty 
to the people at large– which was to do what I could 
by bringing external pressure to bear to induce the 
[NAS] Council to take up this as their most important 
avocation. In order to criticise their position from an 
exterior point of view, I resigned my seat on the Coun-
cil and I wrote and advocated in the Press that they 
should take up a work of this nature, which has since 
been taken up by the Order of St John.37
With considerable entrepreneurial spirit, John Fur-
ley took up the campaign.38 His observations of the 
mechanics of ambulance work were turned to ac-
count on his return to England through the design of 
wheeled stretchers and first-aid accruements. He was 
consistently attentive to the comfort of the injured 
and their ease of transportation: telescopic handles 
for stretchers that could be then loaded directly into 
ambulance wagons, electric lights for ambulances to 
aid night-time search parties, and India-rubber tyres 
to minimise uncomfortable jolts. These designs were 
then patented and put into production by Messrs. 
Marshall Bros., a firm of coachbuilders in Ashford, his 
hometown. These became known as Ashford Litters 
(ambulance wagons) and Furley Pattern Stretchers 
and could be purchased through the St John “Ambu-
lance Department”, of which Furley was store man-
ager.39 In the year 1895, for instance, 33 Ashford Lit-
ters and 359 Furley Stretchers were sold to St John’s 
Divisions and first-aid stations in factories, pit heads 
and railway stations up and down the country (St John 
Ambulance Association, 1895, p. 17). 
Furley travelled widely to promote the advantages 
of trained St John Ambulance personnel and to dem-
onstrate the virtue of his designs. He secured con-
tracts to supply the London County Council asylum 
board, the metropolitan police, and numerous hos-
pitals; attended meetings of local social science con-
ventions; and awarded medals to winning teams of 
railway men at stretcher-bearing competitions. For 
Furley, it seems, humanitarian gestures had diffuse 
recompense. In 1878, the St John Ambulance Asso-
ciation was launched and the Army Medical Depart-
ment undertook the significant step of guaranteeing 
the Order all necessary materiel in event of a Brit-
ish war, provided the Order supply trained men and 
nursing staff (Order of St John, 1878, p. 19). By the 
end of that year, 1,100 men and women had attend-
ed a St John first-aid class, and regional branches 
continued to spring up. A year later, approximately 
3,000 people had completed the course in London 
alone (Summers, 2000, p. 142).
THE POLITICS OF RELIEF 
In 1889 the St John Ambulance Association pub-
lished its Reports of First and Second “Crusades” in the 
Northern Counties of Durham and Northumberland 
(St John Ambulance Association, 1889). These were 
part of a wider campaign to establish first-aid centres 
in the regions and to thwart Loyd Lindsay and other 
“unbelievers” on the NAS Council. By now, this inter-
nal politics of relief had become entangled with party 
politics and broader concerns over Britain’s role in for-
eign affairs. Palmieri notes that, in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, the ICRC did not concern 
itself with wars other than between European nation 
states (Palmieri, 2012, p. 7). The same was not true 
of those wearing the Red Cross armband and proffer-
ing relief on behalf of national societies. Britain’s ab-
stention from the Franco-Prussian War had conferred 
upon British relief workers the neutrality of their na-
tionality, and had deferred the question of loyalty in 
the event of a British war. But events in the Balkans, 
and British Army involvement in the “scramble for Af-
rica”, soon altered the status and purpose of voluntary 
aid work, and brought it increasingly to the War Of-
fice’s attention.
 In 1876, on outbreak of war between Serbia and 
Turkey, members of the Order of St John met at the 
house of their Grand Prior Sir Edmund Lechmere to 
establish an Eastern War Sick and Wounded Relief 
Fund. After a public meeting at Willis’ Rooms, it was 
decided to amalgamate with the NAS to form a joint 
Committee for “Turko-Servian Relief” underwritten 
with a £20,000 grant from the NAS. This organisation 
took over the surgeons and stores already dispatched 
by the Eastern War Sick and Wounded Relief Fund. 
Disagreements arose from the start. Loyd Lindsay’s 
insistence on opening a stationary hospital in Bel-
grade seemed, to members of the Order, to ignore 
the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War. Having, it re-
ported, “scarcely any voice” on the Committee, the 
Order’s advocacy of flying hospitals was disregarded. 
“[D]effects in the organization, and even in the plan 
pursued, in administering the relief of the wounded,” 
were duly criticised (Order of St John, 1877, p. 11). 
Members of the Order were rankled further by Loyd 
Lindsay’s vocal denunciation of the Serbian rebellion, 
which he blamed on Russian intrigue, during his visit 
to the NAS’s British hospital in Belgrade. Loyd Lindsay 
was a Tory MP in the Disraeli government. Such ar-
guments were in keeping with the Prime Minister’s 
unwillingness to support insurgents in the region for 
fear of antagonising and further weakening Britain’s 
Ottoman ally. In this context, the distribution of NAS 
supplies by consular staff and their wives in Con-
stantinople, Serbia and Albania operated as a form 
of “humanitarian diplomacy”.40 For those associated 
with the Order, Loyd Lindsay’s combination of po-
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litical propaganda and relief work was indefensible 
(Pearson & MacLaughlin, 1877, p. 141). To Humphrey 
Sandwith, one of the original surgeons sent out by the 
Order, Loyd Lindsay was guilty of indulging, “Turkish 
proclivities at the expense of a charitable society.” 41 
Archibald Forbes of the Daily News insinuated that 
Loyd Lindsay was spying on behalf of the Turks. The 
reality, it seems, was that Loyd Lindsay was document-
ing his observations of military arrangements and 
sending them to Disraeli. He even offered his services 
as a regional expert to the British delegation at the 
subsequent Peace Conference in Constantinople. 42
Furley, with experience of aiding the wounded in 
the Paris Commune and of both sides in the Carlist 
War, was emphatic about the need for neutrality.43 
But it is quite possible too that his anger over Loyd 
Lindsay’s Balkan interventions was piqued by political 
sympathy. Certainly, the publications of many of those 
associated with the Order who dispensed relief in the 
region expressed their support for the Slav cause. 
Humphrey Sandwith condemned Turkish “barbarity” 
in letters he sent for publication in the British press, 
and was to later denounce the Turkish massacre of 
Bulgarians and accompanying “slave raids” in his pam-
phlet England’s position with regard to Turkey and the 
Bulgarian Atrocities (Sandwith, n.d., p. 7). Paulina 
Irby, who had contributed funds to launch the origi-
nal Eastern War Sick and Wounded Relief Fund, had 
previously devoted herself to work on behalf of Chris-
tian refugees in the region and made no secret of her 
support for Slav nationalism.44 Meanwhile Lady of the 
Order Viscountess Strangford opened her own Bulgar-
ian Peasants Relief Fund, determined that “every pi-
aster that I give away will pass from me into Bulgarian 
hands”.45 Aid to Christians living in the Ottoman lands 
carried a symbolic charge for a body eager to appro-
priate the medieval Hospitaller tradition. Strangford 
had herself received the order of the Holy Sepulchre 
from the patriarch of Jerusalem to mark her ances-
tors’ involvement in the crusades.46 Two years before 
the “Bulgarian atrocities”, she had offered to re-estab-
lish the Order’s presence in the Holy Land with a grant 
for a hospital in Damascus (Order of St John, 1874, p. 
6). Though this venture never bore fruit, by the early 
1880s, the Order had succeeded in founding an eye-
hospital in Jerusalem (Lechmere, 1883). With Disraeli 
attempting to avoid war with Russia through a precar-
ious diplomatic balance-of-power, Henry Brackenbury 
was astute to the political consequences of this rush 
of ad hoc voluntary aid. Would it be unwarranted, he 
asked, in times of insurgency, if one of the belliger-
ents “promptly inflicted summary justice upon these 
agents for aiding and abetting rebellion.”?47 Once 
again, he counselled the need for voluntary aid to be 
regulated and brought under the control of the War 
Office. In the event, Britain remained neutral, though 
jingoism and the fear of a war in the Balkans gave add-
ed impetus to the newly-founded St John Ambulance 
Association (Summers, 2000, p. 141). But it would 
take a British war for these questions to stimulate War 
Office action. 
In 1884 the NAS undertook its first foray in support 
of the British Army. To accompany General Wolseley 
in his daring mission to rescue General Gordon at 
Khartoum, the NAS had commissioned a specially-
designed steamer to withstand the shallow waters of 
the River Nile. With few men lost to injury in this cam-
paign, NAS funds, after the salaries of staff had been 
deducted, were spent mostly on oranges and tobacco 
for the comfort of the wounded. Loyd Lindsay could 
reflect with pride upon a successful example of inde-
pendent and responsive voluntary aid. This did not, 
however, prevent John Furley renewing his critique of 
Loyd Lindsay’s methods in the pages of The Nineteenth 
Century (Furley, 1885). Furley’s consistent advocacy of 
greater regulation was rewarded in 1899 by the first 
of a number of re-organisations: the creation of the 
Central British Red Cross Committee [CBRCC], com-
prising members of the NAS, the St John Ambulance 
and the Princess Christian Nursing Reserve. It would 
soon face its first challenge, once again in Africa.
The South African War of 1899-1902 was to stretch 
British military and medical resources in unexpected 
ways. The effects of siege warfare, of the difficult 
transportation of food and medicines on single-track 
railways, and of the large numbers of sick requiring 
prolonged nursing, placed great stress upon hospital 
orderlies and medical stores, and forced the military-
medical authorities to rely upon volunteers of vary-
ing proficiency. Hopes that the CBRCC would be rec-
ognised as a central co-ordinating agency were soon 
dashed. Furley vented his frustration at “lady ama-
teurs” and their vanity projects.48 Irritation peaked 
at the spectacle of the Netherlands Red Cross aiding 
the armies of the Boer Republic and flying the Dutch 
flag alongside the Red Cross flag.49 This was enough 
for Kitchener to order their immediate capture and 
detainment. In light of these troubles, the military re-
formists who congregated at meetings of the Order of 
St John proposed two significant re-organisations: the 
establishment of a new British Red Cross Society un-
der War Office direction, and a re-negotiation of the 
1864 Geneva Convention. With Robert Loyd Lindsay’s 
death in 1901, the old voluntary spirit of the NAS had 
to rely for its defence on the trenchant advocacy of his 
wife Lady Wantage, a stalwart of its Ladies Commit-
tee, and of his nephew, Archie Loyd. But this was to 
be Sir John Furley’s moment.50 Working alongside two 
fellow Knights of the Order, Sir Alfred Koegh, the di-
rector-general of the Army Medical Service, and Lord 
Knutsford, Loyd Lindsay’s replacement as Chair of the 
Red Cross Committee, Furley was commissioned to re-
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port on a re-organisation of voluntary aid in readiness 
for war. He recommended a new central headquarters 
for the training, examining and registering of civilian 
first-aiders, with branches throughout Britain and the 
empire. Despite objections from leading members 
of the NAS, who justifiably felt such a scheme jeop-
ardised their independence, a merger of the Central 
British Red Cross Committee and a reluctant NAS was 
affected by royal command in July 1905 and the new 
British Red Cross Society (BRCS) was inaugurated. The 
BRCS was born on a war footing. It was responsible for 
creating Voluntary Aid Detachments, to be attached 
to the Territorial Force at county level and prepared 
to oversee the transportation of wounded from field 
ambulance to base hospital in the event of an antici-
pated German invasion. The British Army now had a 
co-ordinated system of on-demand voluntary aid for 
the rapid transport and treatment of the wounded. 
Nevertheless, if the uncongenial sight of the Dutch 
Ambulance’s open partisanship in South Africa was 
not to be repeated, then the status of national soci-
eties in a future war required clarification. The need 
now was to ensure that international law accorded 
with British arrangements. 
Since the debacle of the South African War, volun-
tary medical organisations had been subject to offi-
cial scrutiny. Not only had the Dutch ambulance staff 
contravened the neutrality of the Red Cross flag, but 
the British army was, for the most part, uninformed 
of the purpose –or even existence– of the CBRCC. In 
addition, and of particular annoyance to those seek-
ing the supersession of the NAS, the ICRC had con-
tinued to recognise the NAS as the official Red Cross 
organisation in Britain, and it was to the NAS that it 
sent its communications rather than the CBRCC.51 The 
job of proposing a revision of the 1864 Geneva Con-
vention –and of bringing the ICRC to order– was given 
to Major-General Sir John Ardagh, a distinguished ex-
pert in military intelligence at the War Office. Ardagh 
sat on the executive of the NAS, and, from 1905, was 
a member of the new BRCS Council.52 In a legal note 
to the Foreign Office he had exonerated Kitchener’s 
order to haul down the national flag from the Dutch 
Red Cross Ambulance in the South African War: “In 
that minute he put forward very clearly the position 
of voluntary ambulances and pointed out that they 
had no rights whatever under the Geneva Conven-
tion of 1864, except as an act of grace.”53 Ardagh 
undertook the review of the Geneva Convention in 
the company of Surgeon-Major W. G. Macpherson 
RAMC. Like Ardagh, Macpherson was a proponent 
of greater regulation on the model of the exemplary 
medical arrangements of the Japanese Red Cross in 
the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. They were 
joined by distinguished professor of academic law Sir 
Thomas Erskine Holland (author of Laws and Customs 
of War on Land, which was issued to the British forces 
in 1904) and by the ever-enterprising Sir John Furley, 
who had written to offer his services.54
Macpherson had been the British government’s 
representative at the Seventh International Confer-
ence of Red Cross Societies in 1902. In his private re-
port, he was dismissive of the ICRC, who were, “under 
nobody’s orders, and are not in any way obliged to 
render an account of their actions.” With the activities 
of foreign ambulances in South Africa still fresh in his 
mind, he warned that to separate Red Cross societies 
from the regular army medical services would,
give the Societies that are less under State control, a 
power of pushing their claims as neutrals in the cause 
of humanity … and it would give the International 
Committee of Geneva a power of interference in the 
international questions of the Laws and Customs of 
war, for which it has not special qualification. 
“What then becomes of the international Commit-
tee?” he asked. His answer was to cut it adrift: “In 
my opinion they perform no function which is of real 
importance except in the organization of Peace Con-
ferences and in maintaining a high ideal among those 
Societies which have not been well organized under 
State or War Office control.”55 
When, some years later, Ardagh and his commit-
tee reviewed the text of the revised 1906 Geneva 
Convention, they could reflect with some satisfac-
tion that, “the articles … in the main agreed with 
those contained in the British project” (the Projet 
de Convention Revisée was an advance draft sent 
by the plenipotentiaries). The ambiguous status of 
voluntary medical workers was now resolved: offi-
cial agencies, staffed by voluntary personnel, “must 
be duly recognised and authorised by their govern-
ments ... [and] accorded the same privileges as that 
of the regular medical service.”56 By the First World 
War, the interests of the new British Red Cross So-
ciety openly converged with those of an expanded, 
modernised and “civilianised” military. But it was less 
straightforwardly the case pace John Hutchinson that 
the original purpose and independence of the volun-
tary aid movement had been subverted by its grad-
ual co-option by the War Office, than that a group 
of reform-minded individuals had successfully advo-
cated for changes in the military’s medical arrange-
ments through their opportune experimentation and 
surveillance as aid workers in foreign conflict. If the 
standing of the ICRC was challenged by the assert-
iveness of the national societies, then a more direct 
threat to its existence was posed by the creation of 
the American-backed League of Red Cross Societies 
1919 (Hutchinson, 1995). And yet, far from wilting, 
in the immediate post-war period, the ICRC turned to 
account those “high ideals” which Macpherson had 
viewed as so insipid, and its elitist, narrow composi-
tion (that “irresponsible Committee of Swiss gentle-
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men”), to successfully re-affirm its singular purpose 
and shore up its authority (Palmieri, 2012, pp. 8-9). 
CONCLUSION
A review of the origins of battlefield philanthropy 
in Britain suggests the extent to which the history of 
the Red Cross movement cannot be told without ref-
erence to people such as Sir John Furley: adventurer, 
innovator, humanitarian entrepreneur and humani-
tarian profiteer. Furley was committed to the efficient 
treatment of the wounded in war, as early as 1869 
recognising the need for “flying hospitals” in place of 
stationary institutions. He was equally committed to 
building up the legend of the Order of St John, and his 
own reputation. Proud of his neutral credentials (de-
rived as much from English chivalry as the protocols of 
Geneva), he was nevertheless happy to associate him-
self with individuals at the Order of St John who were 
outspoken about the need to target aid to Christians 
in the East. In tracing the history of those claiming 
to be “doing good” we need to take account of such 
intricate blends of motivation and ideals. This makes 
the history of humanitarianism, and of the Red Cross 
movement, more complex than generally told. The 
first point to note is that the preservation of life can-
not be separated from organisational preservation, or 
individual ambition. The second is to emphasise that 
the ICRC was not instrumental in the development 
of aid work as a field of endeavour. For the ethos of 
a relief worker such as Furley was not imparted by 
the ICRC, but was worked out in practice, was con-
tingent, and incorporated shifting meanings of neu-
trality –was much closer, in other words, to the idea 
of “humanitarian diplomacy” elaborated by Régnier. 
In Spain, for example, Furley had employed an arms 
smuggler as his servant and guide, but one who knew 
the terrain and could further his quest (Furley, 1905, 
pp. 301-302). Finally, it has become evident that the 
preoccupation with the independence of the “NGO” 
from the state is a modern one: the politics of relief 
in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries were 
inseparable from the shifting politics of state.
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40 NAS, Report of the Operations, 1877, p. 10.
41 Sandwith to Freeman, 16.9.1876, Freeman Papers, The John Ry-
lands Library, FA1/2/184.
42 Loyd Lindsay to Disraeli, 11.11.1876, Disraeli Papers, Bodleian 
Library, Oxford University, B/XVI/C/146.
43 For Furley’s relief work during the Carlist War see Arrizabalaga 
et al. (2013), pp. 350-357.
44 Anderson, 1986, p. 10; Order of St John, 1877, p. 10.
45 The Times, 29.9.1876; Strangford’s hope for Bulgarian inde-
pendence was echoed by her fellow Order of St John associate 
Emma Pearson: “To all thinking persons who really know Servia 
and the Serbs, it is clear her best hope lies in independence.” 
Pearson & MacLaughlin, 1877, p. 15. Nevertheless Strangford’s 
sympathies lay with the Disraelian policy of regional stabilisa-
tion and non-intervention rather than Gladstone’s advocacy of 
British military involvement on behalf of the region’s Christians. 
See her letter to Disraeli, 25.6.1876, Disraeli Papers, Bodleian 
Library, B/XVI/B/113.
46 Elizabeth Baigent, entry for Smythe [née Beaufort], Emily Anne, 
Viscountess Strangford, Dictionary of National Biography On-
line, www.oxforddnb.com.
47 Henry Brackenbury, “Philanthropy in War”, Blackwood’s Maga-
zine, Feb 1877, p. 152.
48 Furley to Loyd Lindsay, 29.10.1900, quoted in Hutchinson, 
1996,p. 243.
49 On this episode, see also Leo van Bergen’s article in this dossier.
50 Furley had been knighted for his services to the wounded in war 
in 1899.
51 Macpherson complained that “The International Committee of 
Geneva … have constituted themselves an authority in whom 
rests the decision as to what is and what is not a Central Red 
Cross Committee for other nations.” Report on the Seventh In-
ternational Conference of Red Cross Societies, 1902, TNA, PRO 
30/40/20. 
52 Ardagh served for the NAS in his official capacity during the 
Sudan Campaign of 1884. His wife and biographer credits Ar-
dagh with the suggestion of inviting the Order of St John, 
NAS and Princess Christian Army Reserve to the War Office to 
form the Central British Red Cross Committee in 1899. Har-
ris, 1909, p.399. Lord Knutsford, Chair of the CBRCC urged 
Ardagh to promote the CBRCC as a peacetime training bu-
reau, and urged the dissolution of the “rival” NAS (and the 
earmarking of the NAS’s substantial funds for the new Cen-
tral organisation for spending in times of war). Knutsford to 
Ardagh, n.d., TNA, PRO/30/40/20.
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53 Harris, 1909, p. 399. The British were not immune from the 
criticism that they had themselves contravened the spirit of the 
Geneva Convention in South Africa. At the Seventh International 
Conference of Red Cross Societies, Macpherson, the British del-
egate, noted accusations of “‘undeniable violation of which the 
English were culpable in South Africa in 1899’ in capturing and 
looting an ambulance of the Orange Free State”. Macpherson, 
Report on the Seventh International Conference of Red Cross So-
cieties, 1902, TNA, PRO 30/40/20.
54 Guy Fleetwood Wilson (War Office) to the Viscount Cranborne, 
Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, 3.4.1903, TNA, 
FO 83/2165.
55 Macpherson, Report on the Seventh International Conference of 
Red Cross Societies, 1902, TNA, PRO 30/40/20. 
56 Ardagh, “Geneva Convention 1906, The Procedure of the Con-
ference”, Ardagh Papers, TNA, PRO. 30/40/3. 
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